Justice as efficiency: Courts and the allocation of electricity in China

dc.contributor.authorLucey, Brian
dc.contributor.authorHe, Feng
dc.contributor.authorFu, Tong
dc.date.accessioned2024-05-28T05:47:23Z
dc.date.available2024-05-28T05:47:23Z
dc.date.issued2023-04
dc.descriptionAs basic institutions in the modern economy, courts enforce contracts for businesses (e.g., Blouin, et al., 2019; Calomins, et al., 2017; Djankov et al., 2003) or corporate governance (e.g., Fia and Sacconi, 2019, Magnan and Martin, 2019). They are the foundation of the market (e.g.,Coviello et al., 2018, Schmid, 2004), but do they matter for the allocation of government-controlled factors such as energy? If not, the economic theorem that “[economic institutions] are the fundamental cause of growth and development” (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2010) needs to be refined at least. Since electricity is a necessity of industrial activities and its main source is fossil fuel (Pérez-Arriaga, 2013), this paper explores how courts affect the allocative efficiency of electricity in a developing country.
dc.description.abstractThis paper explores how the justice of courts affects the allocative efficiency of electricity. We argue that courts with the justice objective will guarantee the allocative efficiency of electricity. With micro-evidence from China, we measure the allocative efficiency of electricity by the elasticity of the reliability of electricity on value added per employee in regression. We then verify that justice in courts positively moderates the elasticity of interest with robustness to the potential endogeneity bias and that corruption as a proxy for injustice has a negative moderation effect. Therefore, we document that the quality of courts determines the allocative efficiency of electricity, thereby enhancing the understanding of economic institutions for sustainable development. keywords: Allocative efficiency, Courts, Electricity, Justiceen
dc.identifier.citationFu, T., He, F., & Lucey, B. (2023). Justice as efficiency: Courts and the allocation of electricity in China. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 84, 101746.
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.intfin.2023.101746
dc.identifier.urihttps://dspace.adu.ac.ae/handle/1/5446
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherScience Direct
dc.titleJustice as efficiency: Courts and the allocation of electricity in China
dc.typeArticle

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