Cancelable biometric schemes for Euclidean metric and Cosine metric

Abstract

The handy biometric data is a double-edged sword, paving the way of the prosperity of biometric authentication systems but bringing the personal privacy concern. To alleviate the concern, various biometric template protection schemes are proposed to protect the biometric template from information leakage. The preponderance of existing proposals is based on Hamming metric, which ignores the fact that predominantly deployed biometric recognition systems (e.g. face, voice, gait) generate real-valued templates, more applicable to Euclidean metric and Cosine metric. Moreover, since the emergence of similarity-based attacks, those schemes are not secure under a stolen-token setting. In this paper, we propose a succinct biometric template protection scheme to address such a challenge. The proposed scheme is designed for Euclidean metric and Cosine metric instead of Hamming distance. Mainly, the succinct biometric template protection scheme consists of distance-preserving, one-way, and obfuscation modules. To be specific, we adopt location sensitive hash function to realize the distance-preserving and one-way properties simultaneously and use the modulo operation to implement many-to-one mapping. We also thoroughly analyze the proposed scheme in three aspects: irreversibility, unlinkability and revocability. Moreover, comprehensive experiments are conducted on publicly known face databases. All the results show the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.