Further comments on ‘SFVCC: Chaotic map-based security framework for vehicular cloud computing’

Abstract

By simulating a clogging attack [1–5], an adversary forces a communicating entity to process a forged/replayed authentication request by the adversary impersonating on behalf of a legitimate entity. The clogging attack represents a significant class of denial of services (DoS) attack and quality of services (QoS) degradation attack [3–6]. The clogging attack can be launched through the replay of old messages and get these accepted as legitimate and fresh ones from the receiving entity or adversary can try to construct a forged message, which can pass authentication requests from the receiving entity [6]. In both cases, the legitimate entity on the other side processes the whole request and constructs a session key, whereas, by launching a clogging attack, the adversary cannot construct the legitimate session key. However, the adversary forces the receiving entity to process all fabricated requests on behalf of a legal entity and believing that the correct session key has been shared with the legal entity. Therefore, execution of a clogging attack burdens the system and can cause DoS and/or QoS degradation through sending forged/replayed requests [5, 6] As argued in the original comment, using replay of previous messages, an active adversary can easily launch clogging attack on the scheme of Mishra et al. [7]. In case of a clogging attack, the database server (DBS) and radio-frequency identification reader (RFIDR) process all requests generated by a legitimate device and replayed by an adversary causing the burdens on both RFIDR and DBS. A large number of the replayed requests may cause both DoS and QoS degradation.